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Leidschrift, jaargang 26, nummer 3, december 2011 
In 1609, nine years after the first Dutchmen arrived in Japan on the ship 
Liefde, the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie or VOC) had obtained permission from shogun Tokugawa 
Ieyasu to establish a trading post at Hirado, a small port in Kyushu. 
However, the expected trade profits remained forthcoming, and many times 
the VOC-directors in the Republic wondered if it would not be better to 
pack up shop and leave Japan. Only after the establishment of a Dutch 
presence on Formosa in 1624 were the Dutch able to procure a steady 
supply of Chinese wares for the Japanese market, and by the early 1630s the 
trading post became profitable. 
Scholars agree that during the first twenty years of its existence, the 
Dutch factory at Hirado functioned as a base of operations for Dutch 
privateering activities in East and Southeast Asian waters, rather than as a 
profitable trading post. At Hirado the booty was sold, new expeditions were 
being coordinated, and Dutch ships found a safe haven where they were re-
supplied and repaired. From 1619-1622 it was also the home port of the 
combined Dutch-English Fleet of Defense, consisting of five Dutch and 
five English ships. This fleet was created with the purpose of destroying the 
Iberian trade monopoly in Asia, and to secure the Chinese trade for the two 
trading companies. This had to be accomplished by harassing Chinese and 
Iberian shipping between Macao and Manila. With this intent the fleet went 
on two expeditions, one from January till July 1621 and one from 
November 1621 till July 1622. Due to the constant breaking of promises 
and intensifying Anglo-Dutch rivalries, both in Asia and within the joint 
fleet itself, it was decided to disband the Fleet of Defense after the second 
expedition, and the Dutch continued their battle against the Iberians on 
their own.1 
                                                     
1 A. Clulow, ‘Pirating in the Shogun’s Waters: The Dutch East India Company and 
the Santo António Incident’, Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies 13 (2006) 65-80: 65; 
P. van Dyke, ‘The Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense (1620-1622): Prelude to the 
Dutch Occupation of Taiwan’ in: L. Blussé ed., Around and About Formosa. Essays in 





The above raises some questions about the Hirado trading post. For 
instance, what did it take to coordinate these privateering activities? What 
was necessary to equip such expeditions in terms of supplies and manpower? 
Furthermore, since Hirado was strategically situated in the triangle China, 
Japan, and the Philippines, what role did the Hirado trading post play in the 
overall system of Company privateering and warfare in Asia? Apart from 
Adam Clulow, who conducted a study on Japanese mercenaries in 
Company service, scholars have paid little attention to these matters.2 This 
article aims to provide an impetus to fill the void by exploring the role of 
the Dutch trading post at Hirado in the logistics of Company privateering in 
Asian waters circa 1614-1624. Subsequently, it will also briefly examine Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen’s colonization policy on Ambon, the Banda islands, and 
Jakatra, in which, as will be argued later on, Hirado and Company 
privateering played an important part during this period.3  
Although the Dutch East India Company is one of the most well 
documented early modern organizations, unfortunately no ledgers or diaries 
of the Hirado trading post prior to 1633 remain today. For the examination 
of logistics this article relies heavily on the correspondence between Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen and various Company servants, as well as on resolutions 
and instructions concerning Dutch ships and trading posts in Asia. 
 
 
Dutch Privateering and warfare in Asia 
 
The Dutch East India Company was forged amidst the flames of the Eighty 
Years War (1568-1648) with the idea that it would serve as an ally in the 
struggle against Spain. During the sixteenth century the Portuguese were 
Europe’s largest provider of pepper and spices, and after the Portuguese 
                                                                                                                       
Iquan, and the VOC in the East and South China Seas in the First Half of the 
Seventeenth Century’ in: L. Blussé ed., Around and About Formosa. Essays in honor of 
Professor Ts’ao Yung-ho (Taipei 2003) 83-93: 83-84; Historiographical Institute ed., 
Diary kept by the head of the English Factory in Japan. Diary of Richard Cocks, 1615-1622 I 
(Tokyo 1978) xi-xii. 
2 A. Clulow, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Trade: Tokugawa Japan and the Dutch East 
India Company (PhD dissertation, Columbia University 2007). 
3 From 1614 Jan Pieterszoon Coen had worked in Asia as president of the Bantam 
and Jakatra trading posts, as well as being the second in command to the Governor-
General until 1619, when he was promoted to Governor-General.  




and Spanish crowns were united in 1580 the Dutch saw themselves cut off 
from these Asian products. Thus in the 1590s they organized themselves in 
small independent companies and decided to trade directly with Asia, 
sending a total of fifteen expeditions to the East. When it became apparent 
that the Dutch could only establish themselves on the Asian market at the 
expense of the Iberian enemy, land’s advocate Johan van Oldenbarnevelt 
and the States-General urged the many smaller companies in 1602 to 
cooperate in a United East India Company. They argued that by using the 
Company to harm the Iberians through warfare and privateering in the East, 
the enemy’s finances would suffer, and it would also provide the States-
General with much welcomed additional income, which in turn could be 
used in the war effort at the European front.4  
 Privateering was a common form of maritime warfare adopted by 
early modern European powers, and can be described as a legal form of 
state-supported piracy. The privateer had to be in possession of a letter of 
marque, issued by a sovereign power, which gave the holder the right to 
engage in acts of maritime violence and the seizure of enemy ships and their 
cargo. Once a capture was deemed legal the booty was auctioned, and after 
the costs were subtracted the proceeds were divided. In the Dutch case this 
meant that from proceeds of confiscated goods in Asia, the Prince of 
Orange was entitled to one thirtieth percent, the States-General to twenty 
percent, and the crew that took the ship to four percent. The rest was profit 
for the Company. 5  However, the line between pirate and privateer was 
vague, for not all states might recognize the legitimacy of the license held by 
the privateer. As such, it is not surprising that the Spanish and Portuguese 
did not acknowledge the legitimacy of violent acts by the ‘rebellious’ Dutch, 
and since the concept of privateering was unknown to the East Asian 
powers, they too generally perceived and denounced Dutch acts of maritime 
violence in Asia as acts of piracy. 6  Whether perceived as piracy or 
privateering, scholars agree that during the first twenty years of the 
                                                     
4 V. Enthoven, ‘Van steunpilaar tot blok aan het been. De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie en de Unie’ in: G. Knaap and G. Teitler ed., De Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie. Tussen oorlog en diplomatie (Leiden 2002) 35-58: 36-41. 
5 Enthoven, ‘Van steunpilaar tot blok aan het been’, 44-45. 
6 N. Yoko, ‘Hirado ni dentatsu sareta nihonjin baibai buki yushutsu kinshirei [The 
prohibition of the trade in Japanese people and the export of weapons, 





seventeenth century these activities were of the utmost importance for the 
VOC.7  
The lion’s share of Dutch warfare and privateering in the area 
focused around two major objectives that overlapped from time to time. 
One was the establishment of a monopoly in the spice trade, and the other 
was to secure a position on the Chinese market. This encompassed 
extensive campaigns against the Iberians and the indigenous populations of 
the Moluccas – especially Ambon and the Banda islands – as well as 
campaigns on and near the Chinese coast. For example, in 1622 Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen had ordered the conquest of Macao, one of the most 
important positions of the Portuguese in China. The attempt failed, so the 
Dutch decided to build a fortress on the Pescadores, a small island group 
just off the Chinese coast. The Chinese authorities, however, did not 
approve of this, and in 1624 they forced the Dutch under the threat of a 
large naval force to move their base from the Pescadores to Formosa.8 
Furthermore, every year the Dutch engaged in blockading the Spanish 
stronghold in Manila with about ten ships, and they cruised before the 
Philippines, hunting for the silver ships coming from Mexico, Chinese 
junks9 that traded with Manila, and Portuguese ships bound for Nagasaki 
and Macao, all in an attempt to ruin the China trade of the enemy. Another 
                                                     
7 By the year 1623 the Dutch in Asia maintained 21 fortresses, more than 100 ships 
and employed about 2000 civil and military personnel. As much as one third of the 
available ships was engaged in blockades and the cruising for enemy vessels, of 
which approximately 150 or 200 were taken in Asia. The income this generated is 
estimated to have amounted to roughly ten million guilders, which was enough to 
cover more than half of the operating costs in Asia. It is even argued that without 
privateering the Company would have been bankrupt before 1623. Enthoven, ‘Van 
steunpilaar tot blok aan het been’, 42, 45-46; E. van Veen, ‘VOC Strategies in the 
Far East (1605-1640)’, Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies 3 (December 2001) 85-105: 
92.  
8 For a good account on these events see for example L. Blussé, ‘De Chinese 
nachtmerrie. Een terugtocht en twee nederlagen’ in: G. Knaap and G. Teitler ed., 
De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie. Tussen oorlog en diplomatie (Leiden 2002) 209-237; 
T. Andrade, ‘The Company’s Chinese Pirates: How the Dutch East India Company 
Tried to Lead a Coalition of Pirates to War against China, 1621-1662’, Journal of 
World History 15.4 (December 2004) 415-444. 
9 A junk is a large Chinese ship with three masts and a considerable high and broad 
stern. VOC Glossarium (Instituut voor Nederlandse geschiedenis, The Hague 2009) 
57. 




tactic involved persuading Chinese merchants to trade on locations where 
the Dutch were stationed instead of Manila. Furthermore, the Company 
frequently requested Chinese authorities the right for free trade, which was 
always firmly rejected. At the same time the Dutch saw how these same 
officials tried to persuade Chinese pirates, who were constantly raiding the 
Chinese coast, to cease their activities by granting them prestigious posts. 
Watching these practices, the Dutch decided to expand their privateering 
activities from Chinese-Philippian shipping to the Chinese coast in order to 
harass the Chinese authorities in allowing the VOC to establish a permanent 
position on the Chinese market.10  
During the years 1621-1623 as much as one third of the available 
ships were engaged in blockades and privateering activities. Apart from a 
brief period of collaboration with the otherwise rival English East India 
Company, the Dutch also cooperated with certain Chinese pirate bands in 
these endeavors. Sometimes the Dutch even employed Chinese pirates by 
providing them with Company letters of marque. The Chinese pirate, and 
later official, Zheng Zhilong, who pillaged under the Company’s flag, is a 
good example of this. However, the Chinese pirates proved to be an 
unpredictable lot, and rivalries for supremacy eventually broke out. In the 
1620s, alliances between the Dutch and various Chinese pirate bands shifted 
back and forth. Ironically, at one point Zheng Zhilong found himself 
against the Company, and eventually won the pirate wars that followed. For 
their limited supply of Chinese goods the Dutch now saw themselves 
dependent on treaties and agreements with Zheng Zhilong and later his son 
Zheng Chenggong.11  
 
 
Organizing and Coordinating the Raids 
 
Let us now have a closer look at the way these undertakings were organized, 
and the role Hirado played herein. From the correspondence between Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen and various VOC personnel in Asia it becomes evident 
that there were four major hunting grounds for Dutch privateering ships. 
First of all, there were the regions in and around the Moluccas. Secondly 
there was the area close to the Philippines, thirdly the area stretching from 
                                                     
10 Van Veen, ‘VOC Strategies in the Far East’, 93-96; Andrade, ‘The Company’s 
Chinese Pirates’, 423, 433-437. 





the coastline of Siam to that of China, including the area around the island 
Formosa, and finally the region between Formosa and Japan that 
encompassed the direct vicinity of the western Kyushu coast. In order to 
operate so close to the Japanese coast it was necessary for the Dutch to 
secure some level of support from the Tokugawa shogunate (bakufu) for 
VOC privateering. In his article on the Santo Antonio incident Clulow shows 
how on 18 August 1615 the Dutch tried to put it to a test by taking the 
Portuguese junk Santo Antonio in Japanese waters. If the bakufu would 
approve of, or at least consent to the capture, the Dutch would assume this 
meant that the Company had the go-ahead to expand its privateering 
operations to the waters of the Japanese archipelago. Most of all it would be 
possible to attack the Portuguese galleon12 that shuttled between Macao and 
Nagasaki every year, while it was in Japanese waters.13 In the lawsuit that 
followed, the bakufu eventually ruled in favor of the Dutch. The result was 
that Jan Pieterszoon Coen intended to extend privateering against 
Portuguese shipping into Japanese waters, and he sent ships to Japan with 
the instruction to intensify the hunt for the galleon that shuttled between 
Macao and Nagasaki. 14  Besides the concerning ships’ captains, these 
instructions were usually also sent to the trading posts these ships would 
frequent on their journey, which resulted in a fairly detailed plan de campagne 
that gives us insight in the route and duration of these undertakings. 
Unfortunately, the scope of this article does not allow for an extensive 
treatment of all Dutch privateering activities in the Japanese region. 
Therefore, the following two expeditions and their aftermaths will serve as 
an example of the way these undertakings were generally conducted. Not 
only do they show the general level of organization involved, but more 
specifically they show the Hirado trading post’s usual attitude towards these 




                                                     
12 A galleon is a large ship with three or four masts and high sides, which was 
particularly favored by the Iberians. These Iberian ships were usually beautifully 
decorated, but were not very suitable for fighting. VOC Glossarium (Instituut voor 
Nederlandse geschiedenis, The Hague 2009) 45. 
13 Clulow, ‘Pirating in the Shogun’s Waters’, 65-66, 68-70. 
14 Ibidem, 78-79. 






fig. 1: Some of the Areas and Locations 
important to the Dutch East India 
Company in East and  Southeast Asia, circa 
1614-1624. 
 
On 14 May 1616, the ship Swarte Leeuw had received orders from Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen to sail from Bantam directly to Patani, and then straight 
to Sangora to pick up the cargo destined for Hirado.15 From Siam it had to 
cruise for the galleon, if possible in the company of the yacht Jaccatra. In the 
meantime the Dutch ‘friends’ in Sangora had to assist in the endeavor by 
sending some ships via Macao, without being detected, to cruise the route 
between the Chinese mainland and an island group north of Formosa until 
the 15th of July. In case they did not encounter the galleon, the Swarte Leeuw 
and Jaccatra had to sail to Meshima, a group of islands near Hirado, and 
position themselves near the Goto-Islands. There they had to wait for 
                                                     
15 Patani and Sangora were places in Siam (present-day Thailand) where the VOC 





instructions by Jacques Specx, chief of the Hirado trading post, and see if 
there was still time for the Jaccatra to cruise in the vicinity of Nagasaki. 
Before definite action could be taken Specx had to cautiously sound out 
how high officials of the shogunate and other influential Japanese would 
react if the Portuguese galleon were to be captured in Nagasaki. Likewise he 
had to find out if these officials were willing to look the other way in 
exchange for a large portion of the booty. In case of success they had to 
record a detailed account of the cargo, and, depending on the best course of 
action at the time, bring the booty to either Hirado or Bantam. Even 
though they had to search for the galleon as long as possible, it was vital to 
take into account the northeast monsoon. No later than the end of 
November 1616, the Swarte Leeuw had to take in the silver and provisions 
from Hirado and either return to Bantam or sail to Patani. Furthermore, all 
the junks that were visited at sea, which had no Portuguese, Spanish or 
prohibited goods on board, had to be released unmolested.16 
 Roughly two weeks later, on 26 May 1616, the ships Galliasse, 
Bergerboot, Halve Maen, Vlissingen and Jamby were instructed to sail to Jambi in 
order to map the area. Subsequently, they had to attempt to procure a good 
quantity of pepper and return to Bantam. If, however, they received word 
that the enemy armada was near Malacca or the Moluccas, and the route via 
the west coast of Sumatra was passable begin or mid August, the Galliasse 
had to sail there in order to damage the enemy. In case the Galliasse and 
Bergerboot could not be fully loaded with pepper, and the ships’ councils did 
not resolve to set sail for the Moluccas, the Galliasse had to be sent to Patani 
at once, from where it would join the Swarte Leeuw on its hunt in Japanese 
waters. Instructions for this undertaking would be provided in Patani.17  
After about five months the first reports of this expedition reached 
the ears of Jan Pieterszoon Coen. According to Specx, the council in Hirado 
had decided not to send the ships out to look for the galleon, because it had 
not been sighted that year (1616). Furthermore, for the same reason, the 
council had decided to send the yacht Jaccatra to Patani on request of 
Hendrick Janszen, head of the Patani factory, to transport a valuable load 
back to Hirado. Throughout his letter, Specx kept hammering on the fact 
that it was a council decision and not his personal one.18 In a letter dated 31 
                                                     
16 H.T. Colenbrander ed., Jan Pietersz. Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indië II 
(The Hague 1920) 109-111, 113-114. 
17 Coen, Bescheiden II, 119-122. 
18 National Archive, VOC inv. 1063, micro 5031, fol. 120-130. 




October 1616, Hendrick Janszen writes that the Jaccatra was in too bad a 
shape to hunt for the galleon. Besides, there was no more time left, because 
they had waited too long to dispatch it in order to get as much good 
commodities on board as possible. Also, they did not want to risk the 
precious cargo. The ship Galliasse had arrived in Patani as well, and although 
they did intend for it to hunt the galleon, in the end it was considered to be 
too dangerous because of the coming monsoon.19 
After seeing these explanations, Coen considered them to be 
completely absurd and unfounded.20  In two letters of 23 April 1617 to 
respectively Jacques Specx and Hendrick Janszen, Coen showed his 
discontent for the fact that against his orders the ship Swarte Leeuw had not 
been dispatched on time, and more importantly, nothing had been done in 
the hunt for the Portuguese galleon. He informed both men of a new 
expedition that had to be conducted in a similar fashion as the one from 
spring 1616. He ordered the ships to hunt for the galleon, and ‘for all he 
cared they were to sail straight for Macao to do so.’21 In the instructions for 
the ships Galliasse and Swarte Leeuw he used a much harsher tone. In these 
instructions he wrote that in case the galleon would arrive in Nagasaki two 
or three days before them, and provided that it had not yet unloaded its 
cargo, they must try to capture it no matter the consequences for the Dutch 
position in Japan. In case of success Jacques Specx would have to try and 
smooth things over with the Japanese by presenting them reasonable gifts. 
If this proved to be impossible Specx was to close the factory and leave 
Japan.22  
In spite of Coen’s harsh words, again the hunt for the galleon ended 
in failure. In a letter dated 12 October 1617, Jacques Specx explains how 
they had strived very hard to seize the vessel, but that it outsmarted them 
and run into a harbor about ten miles south of Nagasaki. Because the 
harbor was too shallow and they had contrary winds they decided to stop 
the hunt. They had equipped the ship Hollantschen Leeuw after its arrival, and 
intended to have it cruise for the galleon the next day under the pretext of 
looking for a Dutch junk that stayed behind. However, Specx continues: 
 
                                                     
19 W.Ph. Coolhaas ed., Jan Pietersz. Coen. Bescheiden omtrent zijn bedrijf in Indië VII a 
(The Hague 1952) 215-216. 
20 Coen, Bescheiden II, 232. 
21 Ibidem, 236. 





Unfortunately, due to a huge typhoon that suddenly rose the previous 
evening nothing could be done. If only [the ship] had set sail on 
another day. Since time immemorial was there not such a strong wind 
this time of year, so much that it seems as if God Almighty does not 
look favorable upon this expedition.23  
 
In a letter of 30 March 1618 Coen merely replied to these events that 
one should have patience and that the news that the galleon had been 
missed a third time would really sadden the directors in Holland.24 In a later 
letter to Hendrick Janszen, Coen also admits that he was perhaps a bit hasty 
when he remarked that the galleon had to be captured even at the cost of 
banishment from Japan. He had acknowledged that the factory in Japan had 
its uses.25    
Through the above it becomes apparent that these raids were loosely, 
but very economically organized. Ships charged with hunting enemy ships 
were also charged with the transportation of goods and capital between 
trading posts. Involved parties often had to make decisions on the scene, 
based on their own judgment, but to some extent attention had to be given 
to Coen’s plans for the capture of the Portuguese galleon. The councils of 
the Hirado and Patani trading posts more than once seem to have 
disregarded Coen’s wishes on this point in favor of their own respective 
agendas. It appears that these trading posts put more value on the 
transportation of goods and capital than on the hunt for enemy vessels. 
Furthermore, we also have to consider the fact that Specx had to operate 
carefully in and around Japan. Iberians, Chinese and even English alike were 
taking every opportunity to smear the Dutch’s good name – denouncing 
them as mere pirates – at the shogunal court in Edo, hoping the Dutch 
would be expelled from Japan.26 Thus, whether it was deliberate or not, 
Hirado seemed to have played a rather ineffective role in organizing and 
coordinating these raids in Japanese waters. Of course there was some 
occasional success in the Japanese region, but it appears that most 
privateering successes have been achieved by the Fleet of Defense in the 
                                                     
23 Coen, Bescheiden VII a, 287-289.  
24 Ibidem, 369. 
25 Coen, Bescheiden II, 321. 
26 Historiographical Institute ed., Diary kept by the head of the English Factory in Japan. 
Diary of Richard Cocks, 1615-1622 II (Tokyo 1979) 331-333, 335-337. 




area of Manila and the Moluccas, after which the booty was sold at 
Hirado.27    
 
 
Supplies, Manpower and (Forced) Migration 
 
From its establishment in 1609 till 1622 the trading post at Hirado already 
played an important role in provisioning the various VOC ships in East 
Asian waters. The directors in Holland had decided that it was not 
profitable to send much needed supplies from the Republic to the VOC 
trading posts in Asia, hence by 1615 Jan Pieterszoon Coen began to 
entertain the possibility of Hirado fulfilling the role of supplier of all the 
Dutch trading posts in Asia.28  
In terms of food supplies, until 1622 every year orders were placed at 
the Dutch trading post at Hirado for Japanese rice, sometimes varying from 
300 to 1000 tons, but also for flower and bread. Additionally, orders were 
placed for salted and dried fish, salted meat, and salted bacon that had to be 
distributed among the trading posts. Also they requested a good deal of tree 
oil, cod-liver oil, and beans.29 In order to secure the quality of the provisions 
they had to be stored on board of the ships, and after a fair period of time it 
was up to the ship’s council to decide whether these provisions could be 
conserved adequately before being shipped to various trading posts. Besides 
food supplies Jan Pieterszoon Coen also ordered 500 picol of unwrought 
Japanese iron, as well as two dozen cables and cable ropes, which had to be 
fabricated as cheaply as possible, to be used on the yachts.30 Wood, planks 
and several tools also made the delivery list. The wood was, apart from 
being used in reparations, destined to serve as ballast for ships that returned 
to the Republic. The bulk of all these supplies were destined for the 
Moluccas – Ambon and Banda in particular – as well as Bantam and 
Jakatra.31 
                                                     
27 See for example Van Dyke, ‘The Anglo-Dutch Fleet of Defense (1620-1622)’, 61-
81.  
28 Coen, Bescheiden II, 6-7. 
29 Apart from its use in food preparation, oil was a necessity for the production of 
fuses and lamp fuel. 
30 A picol is a unit of measure and translates to roughly 125 pounds. 





In terms of manpower Hirado was the perfect place where the 
Company could recruit swords for hire, as well as procure weapons and 
ammunition to arm its troops in Asia. By the first decade of the seventeenth 
century the newly unified Japan had left behind an era of civil war and great 
turmoil. This meant that a great deal of Japanese warriors were now sitting 
idle. Furthermore, during the (failed) invasion of Korea late sixteenth 
century the Japanese had gained an international reputation as brutal, 
fearless warriors. This explains why as early as 1613 the first Japanese 
soldiers of fortune had left Hirado to fight in the service of the Company 
throughout Southeast Asia. They performed quite to the satisfaction of Jan 
Pieterszoon Coen. So when Coen in 1614 presented his design for the 
procurement of a monopoly in the spice trade to the directors in Holland, 
these Japanese soldiers played a prominent part. According to him, these 
Japanese soldiers were infamous throughout Asia and their reputation in the 
Indonesian archipelago alone would be sufficient to get good results in the 
expedition to the Banda islands. Hence, in 1615, Coen ordered the 
Company servant Hendrick Brouwer in Hirado to buy the junk Fortuyne 
from Jan Joosten van Lodensteijn32, as well as two or three light Japanese 
galleys of twenty or thirty oars each that could be purchased in Miako for 
the sum of 350 guilders.33 Furthermore, they had to modify these Japanese 
galleys so that they could hold heavy canons. Subsequently these ships, 
together with the ship Enckhuijsen, had to be provided with a good 
contingent of Japanese mercenaries, although their number should not 
exceed the amount the Dutch could effectively control.34  
In total about three hundred Japanese soldiers were shipped from 
Hirado to be used in the expeditions in the spice-islands, the siege of Jakatra, 
and the defense of Batavia. The exported weapons amounted to 62 long 
Japanese firearms, 45 swords, 52 spears, eleven bows, 300 pikes, and five 
canons. These canons, however, proved to be of inferior quality once tested, 
so the idea of casting canons at Hirado was abandoned. The Company still 
                                                     
32 Jan Joosten van Lodensteijn was second mate on the ship Liefde, the first Dutch 
ship to arrive in Japan. Joosten was favored by shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu and 
received among others a shogunal pass to trade in East Asia. In their dealings with 
the shogunal court in Edo the Dutch more than once relied on this Jan Joosten. 
33 Miako is present-day Kyoto. 
34  Coen, Bescheiden II, 6-7, 114-117, 232-236; A. Clulow, ‘Unjust, Cruel and 
Barbarous Proceedings. Japanese Mercenaries and the Amboyna Incident of 1623’, 
Itinerario  XXXI.1 (2007) 15-34: 16-19. 




exported the ingredients for gunpowder, which was then mixed at Ambon. 
The Dutch even exported an unknown number of Japanese warhorses, but 
until decent riders could be found in the Indonesian archipelago that could 
ride these horses, Coen thought it best to suspend future orders of this 
nature.35  
 The Japanese soldiers of fortune were not the only human resources 
the Company got from Hirado. As early as 1614 Jan Pieterszoon Coen’s 
plan concerning Ambon and the Banda islands encompassed the 
elimination and forced migration of the local population, which he regarded 
as treacherous and rebellious.36 In order to secure a monopoly in the spice 
trade these islands had to be colonized by people who would have a more 
‘positive’ attitude towards the Company. These people have often been 
thought to be Dutch people, but letters from Coen to Jacques Specx portray 
a different picture. In 1615 Coen requested that Specx would send ‘a good 
deal of married Japanese with their wives and children, as well as a number 
of unmarried Japanese women, which would be used to colonize Ambon 
and Banda.’37 In the years to come Coen repeated this request, and Specx 
had to procure these people by any means necessary, persuading them by 
offering them jobs within the Company with a possibility to become 
vrijburger, or by simply buying them as slaves.38  
 The Chinese also gradually became more important in his plans. He 
was especially looking for a way to convince Chinese merchants to settle in 
Company territory and thought them to be of great importance for the 
viability of the new rendezvous Batavia he founded in 1619. His quest for 
people went so far that the crews of Chinese junks that were taken by 
Dutch privateers in the vicinity of Manila were also pressed into 
participating in Coen’s colonization project. For example, in his instructions 
to the Fleet of Defense 13 June 1620 Coen ordered that of all the captured 
Chinese that traded with Manila, as many as possible should be sent to 
Jakatra. In the event that the Fleet had to move back to its port in Hirado, 
and it so happened to be that the Japanese authorities ordered the release of 
their prisoners, they had to maroon the Chinese on a deserted island (with 
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enough water and food) and guard them with two ships. When the Fleet 
would leave Japan and return to Jakatra they had to pick up the Chinese 
prisoners again.39  
In 1621 Coen’s plans were seriously disrupted when the Tokugawa 
shogunate issued an edict that among other things prohibited the ‘buying 
and selling of men and women, the export of Japanese weapons, the 
entering of Japanese into the service of foreign powers, and ordered a stop 
of all “pirate” activities of the Dutch and English in Japanese waters.’40 
Coen ordered the Dutch at Hirado to do everything in their power to regain 
their old privileges, but he gradually had to abandon his plans concerning 
Japanese mercenaries and migrants. Although it would usher in the end of 
large-scale privateering activities in Japanese waters, the overall strategy of 
privateering and warfare prevailed until the 1630s. Henceforth the company 
had to resort more to diplomacy than force to acquire a fruitful intercourse 





What can we say about the role the trading post at Hirado played in the 
logistics of Company privateering? On these privateering voyages it usually 
was not the case that ships were only hunting for enemy vessels, as they 
were also used in transporting cargo between trading posts. It has become 
apparent that a lot of people were involved in planning these raids on 
Iberian and Chinese shipping. Jan Pieterszoon Coen provided general 
instructions, but for the most part the ships’ councils had to rely on their 
own judgment and instructions from the trading posts they frequented on 
their journey. Although Hirado did participate in the organization and 
coordination, it did not play a greater role than, for instance, the trading 
post in Patani.  
 In addition to the provisions and repairs the factory in Hirado 
provided for VOC ships in the vicinity, every year large quantities of 
foodstuffs were transported from Hirado to the Moluccas, Jakatra, and 
Bantam. Subsequently, the military manpower and materials that the 
Company exported from Japan were likewise to be used in the war effort at 
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the Moluccas. Finally, as early as 1615 we can see that by means of purchase 
or persuasion the chief of the Hirado factory had to procure as many 
Japanese families, as well as unmarried Japanese women, as possible. Coen 
also turned his attention towards Chinese people who, either by gentle 
persuasion or through capture during privateering activities, were to settle 
under Dutch rule. All this in order to make Jan Pieterszoon Coen’s vision of 
colonizing Ambon, the Banda islands, and Jakatra a success. Thus, until 
1621 Hirado clearly played a much more important part as a supplier of 
provisions, war materials and manpower. 
 
